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Obayemi: Pre-Emptive Strikes and Self-Defense

LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING
PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES AND
FORCIBLE MEASURES OF
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER AND
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

OLUMIDE K. OBA YEMI*

When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until
he has struck before you crush him. - Franklin D. Roosevelt **

I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the United States had never unilaterally attacked another
nation militarily prior to its fIrst having been attacked or prior to its citizens or interests fIrst having been attacked. This posture has changed
permanently. On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush of the
United States announced the expansive "Bush Doctrine," when he declared:
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.
It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped and defeated. Either you are with us or you are
with the terrorists. I

* Olumide K. Obayemi is admitted to the Bars of Federal Republic of Nigeria and the State
of California. He teaches Taxation Law at East Bay Law School, Oakland California.
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In the same manner, Vice President Dick Cheney declared before the

National Association of Home Builders on June 6, 2002 thus:
... we also realize that wars are not won on the defensive. We
must take the battle to the enemy and, where necessary, preempt
grave threats to our country before they materialize. 2
On August 26,2002, before the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention, Vice President Dick Cheney went on and declared as well that:
... containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of
mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists
who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United
States. 3
Finally, on March 16,2006, in the National Security Strategy released by
President George Bush, he reiterated his undying commitment to the
"Bush Doctrine." He stated that although America faces a choice between the path of fear and the path of confidence, the path of fear - isolationism and protectionism, retreat and retrenchment, Americans must
always be on the offensive in the war against terror. 4 America's resolve
was restated thus:
America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy
required by the grave challenge we face - the rise of terrorism
fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This
strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the secu-

**

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat of Sept. 11, 1941, quoted in DICfIONARY OF MILITARY
AND N AV AL QUOTATIONS 247 (1966).
See President George Bush's Seminal Speech on Sept. 20, 2001 to the Joint Session of
1.
Congress, discussed by Carol Devine-Molin in The GOP's Magnificent Convention, on September 2,
2004, available at <http://www.gopusa.comlcommentary/cmolinl2004/cdm_0902p.shtml> (last
visited on March 16,2006) [hereinafter "Bush Doctrine"]. The same views were also advocated on
other occasions: see speeches of President George W. Bush at West Point (June I, 2(02)
<http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl2002l06120020601-3.html>; and the President's United
Nations speech of Sept. 12, 2002 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl2002l09120020912l.html>; WASHINGTON POST, June 2, 2002, p. AI; WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 13, 2002, p.AI; see
also, FRANCIS A. BOYLE, WORW POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-167 (1985); FRANCIS A.
BoYLE, THE FuTuRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 79-112 (1989).
2.
See the speeches of Vice President Dick Cheney before the National Association of Home
Builders on June 6, 2002 found at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresidentlnewsspeeches/
speecheslvp20020606.html>.
'3.
The Vice President's speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention on
August 26, 2002 found at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl20020826.html>.
4.
See George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy, dated March 16,2006, available at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsdnssl2006/nss2006.pdf> (last visited March 17,2006).
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rity of the American people. America also has an unprecedented
opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace. The ideals
that have inspired our history - freedom, democracy, and human
dignity - are increasingly inspiring individuals and nations
throughout the world. And because free nations tend toward
peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure.
These inseparable priorities - fighting and winning the war on
terror and promoting freedom as the alternative to tyranny and
despair - have now guided American policy for more than 4
years. We have kept on the offensive against terrorist networks,
leaving our enemy weakened, but not yet defeated. 5
The thesis of this article argues that while the use of preemptive military
strikes, now adopted by the United States against non-state actors and
rogue states, appears to be justified under international law, such a military exercise must be subject to well defined and clearly stated internationallegal rules.
"Preemptive" use of military force is the taking of military action by the
United States against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a presumed military attack or use of force by that nation against the United
States. 6 There is no doubt that preemptive military strike, also defined as
the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, has long
been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law. The
present concern is whether the rules governing self-defense and preemptive strike as formulated in the late Nineteenth century would still pass
muster under the highly evolving rules of modem warfare. When these
rules were initially formulated, most international conflicts were conducted by states utilizing large movements of military personnel and
ammunitions.
The question, then, is should an archaic rule requiring that an actual
armed attack must precede self-defense continue to govern in a computerized age where substantial and catastrophic atrocities can be achieved
by non-state terrorists and rogue states via hidden and unconventional
methods? This author's position, using the events of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington D.C.,
as background, argues for an extension and enlargement of the rule of
5. Id.
6. See Richard F. Grimmett. U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force. Congressional Research
Service (CRS) Report for Congress. Order Code RS2l311 of Sept. 18. 2002. <http://www.mondediplomatique.fr/cahier/iraklIMG/pdf/us_use_oCpreemptivejorce-2.pdf> (last visited March 16.
2(06).
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preemptive and anticipatory military strike. The unconventional methods used by terrorists and their supporters are easily available7 and nations at the receiving end risk being exterminated or at least incapacitated
by ftrst strikes. All states deserve to exist and should be able to protect
themselves against a clear and present danger posed by their enemies.
This is an era of concealed "basement bomb" programs. 8 The present
administration of the United States has indicated its readiness to depart
from the strictures of outdated rules of international self-defense law that
have no direct application or relevance to modem violent attacks or
modem laws. 9 While the Bush Doctrine covers nonproliferation efforts,
missile defense, and other protective measures for thwarting enemies of
the United States, its main preoccupation, and the most important element of the administration's overall approach to U.S. security in the postSeptember 11 th environment, centers around ftghting unconventional
terrorists and rogue states that may be in possession of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).10 According to President Bush:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned
the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent
threat - most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and
air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means ... Instead, they rely on acts of terror
and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction - weapons that can easily be concealed, delivered covertly and used
without warning. The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of
inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipa7.
We must note that the Sept. 11,2001 terrorist attacks were carried out by men from affluent homes who went to aircraft pilot schools, and who hijacked aircraft and turned these aircraft into
"improvised missiles" with which they struck at the hearts of American economic and political
bases.
8.
See Michael E. O'Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg, The New National
Security Strategy and Preemption, 113 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Pouey BRIEF I, 5 (2002).
9.
Its position is that "... as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act
against [such] emerging threats before they are fully formed." See Bush Doctrine supra note I; see
also, The National Security Strategy of the United. States of America, found at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsclnss.htrnl>.
10.
See Bush Doctrine, supra note I.
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tory action to defend ourselves, even if the uncertainty remains
as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States
will, if necessary, act preemptively. The United States will not
use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age
where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the
world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot
remain idle while dangers gather. ll
The only problem is that the Bush Doctrine and the United States' version of preemptive strike is not limited to the traditional definition of
"preemption" - striking an enemy as it prepares an attack - but also includes "prevention" - striking an enemy even in the absence of specific
evidence of a coming attack.12 In the opinion of O'Hanlon, Rice, and
Steinberg, while commenting on the Bush Doctrine:
The idea principally appears to be directed at terrorist groups as
well as extremist or "rogue" nation states; the two are linked, according to the strategy, by a combination of "radicalism and
technology." The administration asserts that deterrence of the
kind that prevailed during the cold war is unlikely to work with
respect to rogue states and terrorists - which the administration
claims are not risk-averse - and which view weapons of mass
destruction not as weapons of last resort but as weapons of
choice. 13
While many states, statesmen, international law jurists, political scientists, commentators, and common citizenry have criticized the United
States' adoption of an expansive preemptive, anticipatory, and/or preventive military strike in the global fight against terrorism, few appear to
have a well-rounded grasp of the dangers posed by non-state actors and
rogue nations to the United States, and as well, to the international community as a whole. 14
In understanding the historical background of preventive military strike

practice, we must note that in the past non-state actors (terrorists, guerrilII.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002) available at <http://www.whitehollse.gov/nsc Inss.pdf> (last visited
Feb. II, 2(02).
12. See O'Hanlon, et.a\., supra note 8, at 3.
13.
Id.
14.
See generally, Leo Van den Hole, Anticipatory Self-Defense under International Law, 19
AM. U. OO'L L. REv. 69 (2003).
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las, drug traffickers, etc.) appeared less threatening to United States'
national security than the well funded, well organized, and potent anned
forces of an enemy nation-state. IS However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 now illustrate, very candidly, that small groups of nonstate actors can exploit relatively inexpensive and commercially available technology to conduct very destructive attacks over great distances. 16 Thus, the rationale for expansion of the preemption strike right
is twofold: (a) to deal with actors who cannot be reliably deterred, and
(b) to address the enormous threat posed by the spread ofWMDY
While supporting the expansion of international self-defense practice, the
superpower invoking the right of self defense, anticipatory attacks, military incursions, and/or right of pre-emptive strike as a basis for military
action against another sovereign nation must bear a very high burden of
establishing the following elements:
1. That the nation against which military action is being considered poses an actual and/or immediate risk to:
(a) their neighbors,
(b) internationalpeace,and
(c) the international community of states;
2. The nation arguing for military invasion of a failed state must
have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is:
(a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
3. There must be a causal connection between the actual or imminent injury and/or risk alleged and the fact that the second
state has failed as a nation; and

15. See Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman, Military Aviation: Issues and Options/or
Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency, CRS Report for Congress, dated Jan. 24, 2005, reavailable
at
ceived
through
the
CRS
Web,
Order
Code
RL32737,
<http://www.fas.orglmanlcrsIRL32737.pdf> (last visited March 15,2006).
16.
[d. at Summary page.
17. See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 4.
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4. The actual or immediate risk of injury posed by failed states
to (a) their neighbors, (b) international peace, and (c) the international community of states would be redress able through foreign
intervention, either by the United Nations or through an international action authorized by the United Nations, before the extreme action of military invasion would be permitted.
On satisfaction of the above elements, through evidence satisfying the
"beyond reasonable doubt" standard, the United Nations, or any other
aggrieved state, may move to initiate military action against non-state
terrorist fugitives and rogue states. The above additional strictures
would enhance a cohesive and more inclusive international action against
terrorists who threaten international peace. In fact, as Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman noted:
Pursuing objectives against non-state actors while "winning the
hearts and minds" of local populations, or at least not alienating
them, appears to be a key consideration. Recent military action
has killed or captured prominent terrorists, but it is unclear
whether this action actually degraded the terrorist organization's
capabilities. In some cases, these actions may have even
strengthened them. 18
In this work, Part II discusses self-defense rules under customary interna-

tional law, and the requirement of immanency and proportionality that
must be met. Part ill discusses self-defense rules under the United Nations (UN) Charter, arguing for an enlarged reading of the "armed attack" requirement and amendment of the Charter. Part N carries out a
historical account of self-defense military actions by the United States
and shows that it has always acted justly and peaceably. Part V discusses
the policy changes in the United States' approach in modern times. Part
VI discusses the advantage of using of preemptive military strikes. The
paper concludes in strong support of the Bush Doctrine and argues for an
expanded use of self-defense rights under customary international law
and the UN Charter.
II.

THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE, INCLUDING PREEMPTNE
STRIKES AND FORCIBLE MEASURES OF SELF-DEFENSE
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Clearly, every nation possesses the inherent right of self-defense under
international law. As David Ackerman aptly stated, "customary interna18.

See Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman, supra note 15, at Summary page.
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tional law deemed the right to use force and even to go to war to be an
essential attribute of every state."19 In the same vein, Charles Cheney
Hyde 20 has declared every nation's inherent right to defend itself against
aggression as, "always l[ying] within the power of a State to endeavor to
obtain redress for wrongs, or to gain political or other advantages over
another, not merely by the employment of force, but also by direct recourse to war."21 In fact, Christianity and Roman Catholicism have always sanctioned the right of a nation to prosecute war to protect itself
from aggression. 22 According to St Augustine, "a sovereign could wage
war only when such action was necessary to accomplish the previously
mentioned objective of building peace through self-defense, punishment
of evil, or recovery of wrongfully taken possessions."23 Thus, under customary international law, a nation faced with aggression from another
nation may militarily move against the aggressor and face no international damnation because:
An act of self-defense is that form of self-protection which is directed against an aggtessor or contemplated aggressor. No act
can be so described which is not occasioned by attack or fear of
attack. When acts of self-preservation on the part of a State are
strictly acts of self-defense, they are permitted by the law of nations, and are justified on principle, even though they may conflict with the ... rights of other states. 24
Closely related to the natural right of self-defense is the natural right of
preemptive strike (as narrowly distinguished from anticipatory selfdefense) whereby a nation that perceives an imminent strike from another aggressor nation may move, preemptively, to strike at the aggressor
nation before harm is done. This preemptive right is also clearly recognized under intemationallaw.

19.
David M. Ackennan, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq,
CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS21314, dated April 11, 2003, available at
<www.usembassy.itlpdfJotherIRS21314.pdf>(last visited March 17,2006).
20.
3 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE,INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY As INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES, 1686 (1945).

21.

Id.

Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Our Cause is Just: An Analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom Under
International Law and the Just War Doctrine, 2 AVE MARlA L. REv. 65, 67 (2004).
23.
SAINT AUGUSTINE, 4 Letters, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 266, 269 (Wilfrid Parsons,
S.N.D. trans., 1953).
24.
See Hyde supra note 20, at 1-2.
22.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol12/iss1/3

8

Obayemi: Pre-Emptive Strikes and Self-Defense

2006]

PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE & SELF-DEFENSE

27

To Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, it is "lawful to kill him
who is preparing to kill. "25 In the same vein, Emmerich de Vattel stated
the customary preemptive right as:
The safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A Nation has the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon
it, and to use force ... against the aggressor. It may even anticipate the other's design, being careful, however, not to act upon
vague and doubtful suspicions, lest it should run the risk of becoming itself the aggressor. 26
A nation's right to take preemptive strike measures are also sanctioned
by Christianity and Roman Catholicism since time immemorial, as evidenced by Saint Augustine's statement that when motivations, such as
hatred, bloodlust, vindictiveness, and ambition pose a threat to the common good, ajust man, acting under the authority of law, could repel them
by force, so long as he himself refrains from such motivations, because
necessity requires that a legitimate authority wage war and only with a
just cause. 27 Under Roman Catholicism, warfare is approved of to punish
evil nations, and even to conquer them, thereby depriving an evil nation
of its liberty.28 Thus, a just sovereign could deprive that nation of its
liberty to engage in evi1. 29
However, there are important concerns raised by this formal doctrine of
preemption. 30 First, it undervalues the still important role of deterrence,
even against so-called rogue states such as Iraq and North Korea. 31 Second, a sovereign could wage war only when such action was necessary to
accomplish the previously mentioned objective of building peace through
self-defense, punishment of evil, or recovery of wrongfully taken possessions.32 Third, it legitimatizes a wider scope for the use of force - preemption without a clear, imminent, and widely accepted threat - that in
general the United States should discourage. 33 Fourth, the nation exerciz25.
HUOOGROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, 1625.
26.
IV EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 3.
27.
XXII SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONTRA FAUSTEM MANICHAEUM 74-78; see also, XIX SAINT
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF Goo, ch. 12 (Marcus Dods trans., Modern Library ed., Random House
1993).
28.
SAINT AUGUSTINE, 3 Letters, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 36, 46-47 (Wilfrid Parsons, S.N.D. trans., 1953); see also, XXII SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONTRA FAUSTEM MANICHAEUM 74,
"Any war executed by divine mandate is ajust war."
29.
See Falvey, supra note 22, at 67.
30.
See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 5.
3!.
[d. at4.
32.
SAINT AUGUSTINE, 4 Letters, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 266, 269 (Wilfrid Parsons,
S.N.D. trans., 1953).
33.
See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 4.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

9

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 12 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3

28

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. xn

ing preemptive measures must undertake an act of war only to promote a
more just peace. 34
The most widely accepted view on the legitimate use of preemptive military force in accordance with international law was best articulated by
then Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, between 1837 and 1842, in diplomatic correspondence with the British Government. 35 Sometime in
1837, after Canadian rebels had used the American ship Caroline to ship
soldiers and military supplies from the American side of the border to
rebels fighting the British rulers on the Canadian side, some British soldiers, under the cover of night attacked the American ship while berthed
on American soil,36 According to David Ackerman,
[T]he U.S. immediately protested this "extraordinary outrage"
and demanded an apology and reparations. The dispute dragged
on for several years before the British conceded that they ought
to have immediately offered "some explanation and apology."37
First, the United States recognized that under international law, a nation
facing imminent aggression from another state may preemptively act to
protect itself. In the opinion of Secretary Webster, an act of self defense
would permit an intrusion into the territory of another state only in exceptional cases. 38 Secretary Webster then went on to lay down two important legal standards that would regulate a nation's right to undertake
preemptive acts against its aggressors under customary international law
and be justified only in "cases in which the necessity of that self-defense
is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."39 Secretary Webster had earlier on stated another
legal requirement in 1841 thus:
It will be for [Her Majesty's Government] to show, also, that the
local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the
moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United
States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act,

34.
See XIX SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF Goo, ch. 12 (Marcus Dods trans., Modem Library ed., Random House 1993).
35.
See letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton of August 6, 1842,
reprinted in II JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906); see generally, David M. Ackerman, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq, CRS
Report RS21314.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
See Ackerman, supra note 19, at 2.
/d.
Id.
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justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that
necessity, and kept clearly within it. 40
From the above, the major requirements for a nation to undertake preemptive military strikes against another nation based upon perceived
imminent danger, (as different from anticipatory military strike which is,
on the other hand, based on latent and remote danger) are (a) "timeliness" and (b) "proportionality" of the threat.41 Although used intermittently, the concepts of "anticipatory self defense" and "preemptive
strike" are two distinct and separate topics in international law. Under
international law, preemptive military strike is best understood to describe military action against an imminent attack and such use of force is
justified under traditional notions of self-defense.42 Similarly, O'Hanlon,
Rice, and Steinberg defined "Preemptive Military Attack" as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, which has long
been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law. 43
"Anticipatory" or "Preventive" self-defense, on the other hand, is used to
describe the use of force against a more remote, yet significant threat. 44 I
n practical international law, and as known to political scientists, anticipatory or preventive self-defense may be overt or covert,45 depending on
the circumstances.
As stated earlier, the Bush Doctrine has broadened the meaning of "preemptive strike" to encompass "preventive war" as well. Under this definition, force may be used even without evidence of an imminent attack to
ensure that a serious threat to the United States does not "gather" or grow
over time.46 We must note, however, that "preemptive war" or "anticipatory attack" is a far less accepted concept in international law. Even
though the United States has threatened or utilized it in previous eras and
in Iraq in 2003, and even though it may be a necessary tool at times,47 the
situations under which a preemptive attack may be carried out have no
clearly marked definitions.

40.
Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox of April 24, 1841,29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1857), quoted in DAMROSCH, LoRI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2001), at 923.
41. See Ackerman, supra note 19, at 2.
42. See Falvey, supra note 22, at 72.
43. See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 1.
44. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and Pre·emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 7, 9 (2003).
45.
Covert actions include using monetary rewards, subtle force, espionage and other softer
contacts to effect regime changes, policy shifts, aid to rebels, assistance and/or logistic supports to
coup d' hats, and co-opting foreign leaders to accept and adopt United States' political views/goals.
46. See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 4.
47.
[d.
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In conclusion, while "anticipatory strike" rules may not be subject to

clear definition and acceptance under contemporary customary internationallaw because the danger posed may not be imminent, it is clear that
where a nation feels that it may be subject to recurring interference and
terrorist attacks by another, it has an inherent right to carry out armed
reprisals against the offending nations and/or culprits. This is in line
with the position stated in the proceedings before the United Nations
Security Council in the aftermath of military strikes on the Libyan cities
of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986:
[A] State whose territory or citizens are subjected to continuing
terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate use of force to defend itself against further attacks. 48
The United States' citizens and interests have been targeted by Osama
bin Laden and/or Saddam Hussein over the last twenty years or so. From
the United States' interests in Kuwait, and the attempted assassination of
former President George H.W. Bush, to the incessant attacks on its servicemen, embassies and diplomatic missions; the attempted Millennium
terrorist attacks, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, these rogue
states have shown an uncanny persistence to attack United States. Therefore the United States is justified in carrying out preemptive attacks
against these states and terrorists under customary intemationallaw. A
state whose territory or citizens are subjected to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate use of force to defend itself against
further attacks. 49
III.

THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE, INCLUDING RESORT TO
PREEMPTIVE AND ANTICIPATORY STRIKE UNDER THE
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The United Nations Charter was adopted in 1945 and modeled after the
Covenant of the League of Nations which itself was established in 1919,
and which was based on the rules of military warfare existing in the latter
part of the Nineteenth century. Then, international warfare occurred
between nations, involving the movement of large armies and machinery
close to the borders where they could be easily observed. Today, in the
computerized Twenty-first century, warfare can be carried out by the
mere touch of a button strapped to a minuscule "basement bomb,"
unleashing destructive biological and/or chemical agents. In this age of
48.
U.N. SCOR, 41" Sess., 265th mtg. at 112-13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2655 (1986) (statement of
Vernon Walters, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations).
49.

[d.
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nuclear weapons, there is virtually no need for the mass movement of
armies and weapons. Similarly, non-state actors have entered into the
fray as WMDs have become more accessible.
Thus, this author takes the position that the narrow provisions of the
United Nations Charter relating to self defense, preemptive strike and
anticipatory self-defense must be amended so that impending nuclear
catastrophes may be averted and so that nations like the United States
have ample freedom to act decisively against catastrophic terrorist
strikes. These new rules would be subject to the standards set out in the
first chapter of this paper.
The central focus of the United Nations Charter is to ensure that disputes
are resolved by peaceful means, along with its prohibition on acts of aggression, and its validation of self defense as a justifying principle. 50
Thus, we must note that the Preamble to the Charter provides that the
United Nations was formed "to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war."51 It is submitted that nothing more would protect the
world and its citizens from nuclear weapons, terrorists and rogue states
than a nation, like the United States, able and willing to act as a policeman of the world within all legal boundaries.

In this regard, we must take cognizance of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 defining the aggression that forms the basis of
self-defense as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any other State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations
... "52 Resolution 3314 goes on to indicate that the first use of armed
force in contravention of the UN Charter is prima facie evidence of an
act of aggression. 53 Clearly, the invasion of Kuwait, the attempted murder of former President George H.W. Bush, and the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks constitute acts of first aggression.
In addition, it is to be noted that the substantive provision of the Charter,
Article 2(3), obligates Member States of the UN to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means."54 Going on, Article 2(4), makes it
mandatory that states refrain from the use of force. The Charter also
50.
51.
Charter].
52.
(1974).
53.
54.
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provides that, "all Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations." This prohibition on the use of force
under the Charter must be tested in light of other relevant provisions.
For instance, in Article 39, the Security Council is authorized to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression" and to "decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain international peace and security."55 Also, Article 42 of the Charter
authorizes the Security Council to take military enforcement measures in
conformity with Chapter VII. Further, Article 51 clearly allows lawful
use of force in the event of an armed attack:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
It has been noted that, as opposed to the traditional right of states under
customary international law to use force, the UN Charter created a system of "collective security" in which the Security Council is authorized
to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression and to decide what measures shall be taken to maintain international peace and security.56
The next question, flowing from Article 51, pertains to what constitutes
an "armed attack?" Under the UN Charter, a prerequisite to the exercise
of the right of self-defense is an act that constitutes an "armed attack."57
As stated above, Article 51 permits a nation to act in self-defense only in
the face of perceived danger, i.e., armed attack. 58 This "armed attack"
theory has found acceptance with the International Court of Justice (lCJ)

55.
See Article 39 of the UN Charter.
56.
See Ackennan, supra note 19, at 3.
57.
Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law:
Terrorism, the Law, and National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 96 (1989).
58. See Van den Hole, supra note 14, at 94 (2003); see also Military and Paramilitary Activi·
ties (Nicar. v. U.S.), 19861C.J. Reports at 347 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
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which held in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),59 holding that:
. [F]or one State to use force against another. .. is regarded as lawful, by way of exception, only when the wrongful act provoking
the response was an armed attack... . In the view of the Court,
under international law in force today -whether customary international law or that of the United Nations system - States do not
have a right of "collective" armed response to acts which do not
constitute an "armed attack."60
Credible threat and imminent pronouncements are enough, over and
above armed attacks. The above IC] decision notwithstanding, it is this
author's position that there would be increased danger in the world if a
nation's right to mount a self-defense is left to another body, particularly
when that body may be incapacitated through veto power. As President
George W. Bush has rightly declared, "the course of this nation does not
depend on the decisions of others. "61 No nation must surrender its right
to survival to another body outside its laws. President Bush rightly went
on to declare the correct position of international law on a nation's right
to secure its citizens, territory, and interests thus:
There is a difference, however, between leading a coalition of
many nations, and submitting to the objections of a few. America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our
country.62
The above position has the backing of eminent professors of international
law. First, there is Professor Myres McDougal who has argued that Article 51 must not be taken so literally as to preclude a victim from using
force in self-defense until it has actually been attacked63 and that Article
51 should be interpreted to mean that a state might use military force
when it "regards itself as intolerably threatened by the activities of another."64 In effect, where Osama bin Laden, Afghanistan, and Saddarn
Hussein continue to restate their desire to cause harm to the American
59. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), ICJ Reports (1986), 14,392.
60.
[d. para 21l.
6l.
The Course Of This Nation Does Not Depend On The Decisions Of Others'; President
Bush State of the Union Address, Jan. 28, 2003, available at <http://www.washingtonposl.com!wpsrv/onpolitics/transcriptslbushtexCOI2803.html> (last visited March 17,2006).
62.
President Bush's State of the Union Address, Jan. 20, 2004, available at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2004/01120040120-7.htm!> (last visited on March 17,
2006).
63.
Proceedings, 57 AM. SOC'Y OF lNT'L L. 165 (1963).
64.
Id.
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nation and its citizens, such would be sufficient to mount an invasion
under the standard enunciated by McDougal above.
Along the same line, Sir Humphrey Waldock asserts that, "it would be a
travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending state to
allow its assailant to deliver the fIrst, and perhaps fatal, blow .... To read
Article 51 otherwise is to protect the aggressor's right to the first
strike."65 There is also the view of Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick66 that
"[t]he prohibitions against the use of force in the Charter are contextual,
not absolute... . The Charter does not require that people submit to terror, nor that their neighbors be indifferent to their terrorization."67 Finally, Colonel Guy B. Roberts68 also supports an unfettered state right to
act preemptively in the face of open danger: "Whatever interpretation
one may take, it is undisputed that the practice of most member states
since the Charter was adopted has been to recognize acts of anticipatory
self-defense as legitimate."69
The United States has engaged in "preventive war" or "anticipatory attack" in the past. In 1983, the United States invaded Grenada to effect
regime change. In 1961, during the "Bay of Pigs invasion," the United
States attempted to sponsor Cuban dissidents to topple Fidel Castro.
Similarly, covert operations aimed at limiting Soviet influences,7° have
been used to effect regime changes in Iran in 1953,71 and in the Congo in
1961 when Patrice Lumumba was removed for then Colonel Mobutu
Sese Seko. The use of military force against Iraq in 2003, while controversial within the international community, was justified by the United
States, the United Kingdom and others, as an action necessary to enforce
existing U.N. Security Council resolutions that mandated Iraqi disarmament. 72

65.
Sir Claude Humphrey Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 45, 498 (1952).
66.
Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations.
67.
Ved Nanda, The United States Armed Intervention in Grenada - Impact on World Order,
14 CAL. W.OO'L L. J. 395,418 (1984).
68.
Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENV. J. lNT'L
L. & POL'y 483, 513 (1999).
69.
Id. at 513, (citing MYRES McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PuBLIC ORDER 190 (1961); DEREK W. BOWETI, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188
(1958)).
70.
See O'Hanlon, et. aI., supra note 8, at 4.
71.
Shah Reza Pahlavi was installed instead of Mossadegh.
72.
See Richard F. Grimmett, supra note 6, at 2.
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In conclusion, and in arguing for an amendment of the UN Charter, this

author aligns with the opinion of Thomas Jefferson73 that written laws,
whether international treaties or domestic laws cannot override a nation's
right to self-preservation:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the
high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws
of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in
danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself,
with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them
with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means. 74
If the UN Charter would create and/or permit lawlessness or prevarication in the face of open danger, the Charter must be amended to permit
total and efficient prevention of harm from rogue states and terrorists
who, themselves, have no respect for the law.

IV. HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THE
RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE BY THE UNITED STATES
History shows that the United States has never been an aggressor. The
attacks on Pearl Harbor and of September 11, 2001 readily support this
historical record. With the exception of the Spanish-American War of
1898, the November 2001 coalition attack on Afghanistan and the March
2003 Iraqi invasion, the United States has never engaged in a preemptive
military attack against another nation, save for interventions carried out
under the Monroe Doctrine. 75
In the latter part of the Nineteenth century extending into the beginning
of the Twentieth century, the United States carried out several military
interventions in various American and Caribbean nations in the western
hemisphere. 76 These U.S. military interventions were grounded in the
view that they would support the Monroe Doctrine, which opposed interference in the western hemisphere by outside nations. 77 The Monroe

73.
74.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 279 (Paul Ford ed., 1898).
[d.
75. See Richard F. Grimmett, supra note 6, at 2.
76.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE, SPEECH OF HON. D. C. DEJARNETIE, OF VIRGINIA, IN THE
CONFEDERATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 30TH, 1865, PENDING NEGOTIATIONS FOR
PEACE, available at <http://docsouth.unc.eduldejametldejarnet.html> (last visited March 16,2006).
77.
The doctrine was conceived by its authors, especially John Quincy Adams, as a proclamation by the United States of moral opposition to colonialism, but has subsequently been reinterpreted in a wide variety of ways, including by President Theodore Roosevelt as a license for the
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Doctrine, as expressed in 1823, proclaimed the United States' opinion
that European powers should no longer colonize the Americas or interfere with the affairs of sovereign nations located in the Americas, such as
the United States, Mexico, and others. In return, the United States
planned to stay neutral in wars between European powers and in wars
between a European power and its colonies. If the latter wars were to
occur in the Americas, the U.S. would view such action as hostile toward
itself.18 The doctrine was issued by President James Monroe during his
seventh annual State of the Union address to Congress. It was a defining
moment in U.S. foreign policy and remained relevant until the end of the
Cold War. 79
The Monroe policy was driven by the belief that if stable governments
existed in the Caribbean states and Central America, then it was less
likely that foreign countries would attempt to protect their nationals or
their economic interests through use of military force against one or
more of these nations. 80 For instance, there was the 1983 invasion of
Grenada by the military forces of the United States and several Caribbean nations. 8! On October 25, 1983, six days after Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was executed by Bernard Coard's Stalinist Sect, the United
States armed forces landed troops on the beaches of Grenada pursuant to
the Monroe DoctrineY American troops withdrew in mid-December
1983, after a bloody battle and the appointment of a new government by
the governor-general. In all, nineteen U.S. soldiers were killed and 106

U.S. to practice its own fonn of colonialism (known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine).
78.
In Monroe's Annual Message to Congress on December 2, 1823, he delivered what we
have come to call the Monroe Doctrine. Essentially, the United States was infonning the powers of
the Old World that the Americas were no longer open to European colonization, and that any effort
to extend European political influence into the New World would be considered by the United States
"as dangerous to our peace and safety." The United States would not interfere in European wars or
internal affairs, and expected Europe to stay out of the affairs of the New World.
79.
See generally, SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1949); DoNALD DOZER, THE MONROE DOCTRINE: ITS MODERN
SIGNIFICANCE (1965); ERNEST R. MAY, THE MAKING OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1975);
FREDERICK MERK, THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM 1843-1849 (1966);
GRETCHEN MURPHY, HEMISPHERIC IMAGININGS: THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND NARRATNES OF
U.S. EMPIRE (2005) (examining the cultural context of the doctrine); DEXTER PERKINS, 1-3 THE
MONROE DOCTRINE 1823-1826 (1927); JOEL S. POETKER, THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1967);
GADDIS SMITH, THE LAST YEARS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE, 1945-1993 (1994) (arguing that the
Monroe Doctrine became irrelevant after the end of the Cold War).
80.
See Richard F. Grimmett, supra note 6, at 2.
81.
This was also known to U.S. forces as "Operation Urgent Fury."
82.
See RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE 454 (1990); MARGARET THATCHER, THE
DOWNING STREET YEARS 327- 331 (1993); Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: the planning
and execution of joint operations in Grenada, 12 October-2 November 1983, JOINT ELECTRONIC
LmRARY 62, retrieved Jan. 10, 2006.
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were injured in the fighting. Cuban and Grenadian losses were reported
to be approximately 100 dead and 350 wounded. 83
The United States military has always had an important role in peacekeeping operations throughout Haiti's history-as shown in the two
cases of the military in peacekeeping operations in Haiti. The United
States entered and occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934 to restore order and
to secure American national security interests. These interests consisted
of protecting some American businesses and providing humanitarian
relief. During this period, the military conducted a massive nation building effort that provided infrastructure for Haiti, re-established the economy and supported the Haitian Govemment. 84 In 1994, the U.S. military
also conducted peacekeeping operations in Haiti, this time to promote
democracy and again provide humanitarian relief. 85
The United States military intervened in the Dominican Republic from
1916 to 1924 to restore normalcy that threatened to affect neighboring
states. 86 Also in 1912, President Adolfo Diaz of Nicaragua requested that
the United States send its military to quell the political revolt. 87

83.

See Operation Urgent Fury, available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_

UrgencFury> (last visited March 16,2(06).

84.
See
The
Road
to
US
Intervention
in
Haiti,
available
at
<http://www.cdi.org/admlTranscripts/8021> (last visited March 16, 2006); see also, EMILY GREENE
BALCH, OCCUPIED HAITI 20 (1969); FREDERICK S. CALHOUN, USES OF FORCE AND WILSONIAN
FOREIGN POLICY 7 (1993); JEAN BAPTISTE DUROSELLE, FROM WILSON TO ROOSEVELT; FOREIGN
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1913-19, 75 (1963); SMEDLEY D. BUTLER, THE PAPERS OF
GENERAL SMEDLEY DARLINGTON BUTLER USMC, 1915 - 1918, 154 (1982).
85. See Major Brent P. Goddard, Military Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti: Should the
United States military have a role in peacekeeping operations in support of the national security
strategy?, CSC 1997, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaryllibrary/reportl
1997/Goddard.htm> (last visited March 16, 2006); see also, That NATO Headache, ECONOMIST,
July I, 1995, at 3; Sean D. Naylor, Well Done, But Warlike it's Not, NAVY TIMES, March 18, 1996,
at 1; Eric A. Doerrer, Operation Vignette: Civil Affairs in Haiti, MILITARY REVIEW, Mar.lApr.
1996, at 2; William Matthews, Haiti Mission Succeeded, Leader Say, AIR FORCE TIMES, March 11,
1996, at I; Public Lives, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 1995, at 1; Elections in Haiti, MACLEAN'S, July 10,
1995, at 21; Reuter, GOP Team Criticizes Haiti's Vote Turnout, THE WASHINGTON POST, April 8,
1997, at A12; James F. Dobbins, Assessing the Progress of Haitian Democracy, DISPATCH, Sept.
25, 1995, at 5; Alexander F. Watson, Support of Democracy and the Rule of Law in Haiti,
DISPATCH, April 1, 1996, at 3.
86. See Joseph E Mulligan, Policing the Dominican Republic, FROM THE NATION, March 01,
1975, available at <http://www.nationarchive.comlSummaries/v220i0008_07.htm> (last visited
March 16,2(06); see also, LESTER D. LANGLEY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN, 19001970 (1980); LESTER D. LANGLEY, THE BANANA WARS: UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN THE
CARffiBEAN, 1898-1934, 160-165 (1988); BRUCE CALDER, THE IMPACT OF INTERVENTION: THE
DoMINICAN REPUBLIC DURING THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF 1916-1924, 115 (1984).
JOHN J. TIERNEY, JR., SOMOZAS AND SANDINISTAS: THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA IN THE
87.
TWENTIETH CENTURY (Councils for Inter-American Security and for Inter-American Security Educational Institute. Ed. 1982) (discussing the rise to power of the Sandinistas and current problems
they pose to the U.S. and Central America); THOMAS W. WALKER, NICARAGUA, THE LAND OF
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Similarly, covert operations were carried out at various times in the past
by the para-military and administrative sectors of the United States Government in the face of impending threats. According to Richard F.
Grimmett:
Although the use of preemptive force by the United States is
generally associated with the overt use of U.S. military forces, it
is important to note that the United States has also utilized "covert action" by U.S. government personnel in efforts to influence
political and military outcomes in other nations. The public record indicates that the United States has used this fonn of intervention to prevent some groups or political figures from gaining
or maintaining political power to the detriment of U.S. interests
and those of friendly nations. 88
In this regard, these covert acts are recognized under the laws of the

United States. For instance, Section 503(e) of the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended, defines covert action as "[a]n activity or activities
of the United States Government to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United
States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." In
Iran in 1953, in Guatemala in 1954, and in the Congo in 1960, covert
operations were used to change the governments of these countries.
However, in the case of the attempted invasion of Cuba in 1961, whereby
United States offered logistic, material, and military support to rebels
that aimed to overthrow Fidel Castro, their efforts failed. The United
States Government nonetheless received a golden chance to redeem its
international reputation during the Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962.
In the fall of 1962, unconfirmed reports suggested that the Soviets were
installing intermediate range nuclear missiles in Cuba. U sing remote
sensing imagery, mainly from high flying U-2 airplanes, the United
States was able to provide incontrovertible proof that the rumors were
true. The spy-plane photographs showed that the Soviet Union was secretly introducing nuclear-capable, intermediate-range ballistic missiles
into Cuba, missiles that could threaten a large portion of the Eastern
United States. 89 President John F. Kennedy was forced to determine if
the prudent course of action was to use U.S. military air strikes in an
effort to destroy the missile sites before they became operational, and
SANDINO (2nd ed. 1982) (chronicling the history of Nicaragua and rise of the FSLN. Profuse with
leftist rhetoric but providing many useful facts).
88.
See Richard F. Grimmett, supra note 6, at 2.
89.
[d. at4.
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before the Soviets or the Cubans became aware that the U.S. knew they
were being installed. 90
While the military "preemption" option was considered, after extensive debate among his advisors on the implications of such an
action, President Kennedy undertook a measured but firm approach to the crisis that utilized a U.S. military "quarantine" of
the island of Cuba to prevent further shipments from the Soviet
Union of military supplies and material for the missile sites,
while a diplomatic solution was aggressively pursued. United
States demanded that the Soviets remove these missiles from
Cuba. The resulting confrontation between Soviet Premier
Khrushchev and US President John F. Kennedy in October 1962
brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. This approach
was successful, and the crisis was peacefully resolved. 91
Thus, during the Cold War, and in major military actions since the Second World War, the President has either obtained congressional authorization for use of military force against other nations, in advance of using
it, or has directed military actions abroad on his own initiative in support
of multinational operations such as those of the United Nations or of
mutual security arrangements like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).92 "Yet in all of these varied instances of the use of military
force by the United States, such military action was a "response," after
the fact, and was not preemptive in nature, as traditionally defined."93
The above historical account would suffice to show that the United
States has not always acted in haste nor has it been a warmonger. If
faced with a credible threat, it has acted to protect itself, its citizens, its

90.
Id.
91.
Id. See also, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, The Cuban Missile Crisis: President Kennedy's
Address to the Nation, October 22, 1962, (National Archives and Records Administration 1988); 3
JOHN FITzGERALD KENNEDY, JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE GREAT CRISES (Timothy NaftaIi, Ernest R.
May and Philip Zelikow, eds. c2OD1); JOHN FITzGERALD KENNEDY, THE KENNEDY TAPES: INSIDE
THE WHITE HOUSE DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, (Ernest R. May and Philip Ze1ikow eds.
1997); John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Kennedy-Khrushchev Correspondence During the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, Department of State Bulletin of November 19, 1973; ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS (W.W. Norton, 1969); MONTAGUE KERN, PATRICIA W. LEVERING AND RALPH B. LEVERING,
THE KENNEDY CRISES: THE PREss, THE PREsIDENCY, AND FOREIGN POLICY (c1983); NIKITA
SERGEEVICH KHRUSHCHEV, KRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: THE LAST TEST AMENT (1974).
92.
See Richard F. Grimmett, supra note 6, at 2. Examples of these actions include participation in the Korean War, the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, and the Bosnian and Kosovo operations in
the 1990s.
93. Id. at 3.
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interests, and its territory. Warfare tactics have changed. The United
States' foreign policy must change as well.
V.

SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN U. S. FOREIGN POLICY
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11,2001
TERRORISTS AITACKS

Since September 20,2001, the policy of the United States is now to hold
responsible and subject to military strikes both the terrorists that attack
United States interests and/or its citizens and the rogue states that harbor
these terrorists. 94 The background to this policy change in favor of anticipatory strikes involves the fact that threats posed by terrorist and
rogue states are more problematic because they encompass the phenomenon of concealed "basement bomb" programs that U.S. intelligence
experts cannot easily locate.95 This change in policy paved the way for
the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and "also sent a clear warning to other
state sponsors of terrorism" that the United States would act whenever it
felt threatened. 96
VI. ADV ANT AGES TO THE USE OF PREEMPTIVE MILITARY
STRIKE THEORY
If the standards elaborated above were adopted by the United States, and

every other state insisting on preemptive rights, it follows that a more
clearly-defined and explicit policy of preemption would emerge under
customary international law that would reinforce deterrence against aggression and terrorism by putting other countries on notice of the United
States' seriousness in addressing threats such as the possession of WMDs
by rogue regimes and non-state actors. 97 While there are misgivings
about the March 2003 military invasion of Iraq, the preemption theory in
support of this military action has allowed the United States to argue that
its focus on Iraq is part of a broader security concept and does not represent preoccupation with a specific regime. 98
Vll. CONCLUSION
As we have previously argued, nations have inherent rights to protect
themselves. While a broad-based doctrine of preemption carries serious
risks, the standards that we have elaborated above are enough to govern
94.
See President George Bush's Seminal Speech on Sept. 20, 2001 to the Joint Session of
Congress.
95.
See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 5.
96.
[d. at 1
97.
[d. at 2.
98.
[d.
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the use of preemptive power by all states. To leave nations to use their
individual subjective standards as a basis for carrying out armed countermeasures against other sovereign states would be a clear invitation to
anarchy. Thus, O'Hanlon, Rice, and Steinberg have rightly suggested
thus:
The Bush administration was right to take a strong stand against
terrorists and extremist states, but it had already accomplished
this goal with its early words in the period after the September
11 attacks and its actions in Afghanistan. It did not need a formal doctrine of preemption to drive the point home. Rather than
enunciate a formal new doctrine, it would have been better to
continue to reserve the preemptive military tool for a narrow,
rare class of situations where inaction poses a credible risk of
large scale, irreversible harm and where other policy tools offer a
poor prospect of success. Given that the doctrine has now been
promulgated, the Bush administration should clarify and limit
the conditions under which it might be applied. 99
The United States must abide by the rigorous standards set out above that
are meant to govern the use of preemptive strikes, because today's international system is characterized by a relative infrequency of interstate
war. It has been noted that developing doctrines that lower the threshold
for preemptive action could put that accomplishment at risk, and exacerbate regional crises already on the brink of open conflict. loo This is important as O'Hanlon, Rice, and Steinberg have rightly noted:
... countries already on the brink of war, and leaning strongly
towards war, might use the doctrine to justify an action they already wished to take, and the effect of the U.S. posture may
make it harder for the international community in general, and
the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay and diplomacy. Potential
examples abound, ranging from Ethiopia and Eritrea, to China
and Taiwan, to the Middle East. But perhaps the clearest case is
the India-Pakistan crisis. WI
The world must be a safe place to live in. We cannot be ruled by bandits
and rogue states. There must be law and order not only in the books but
in enforcement as well. No nation is better suited to enforce internationallaw than the United States. The Bush Doctrine will stand the test
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of time and survive. Again, we submit that nothing more would protect
the world and its citizens from nuclear weapons, terrorists and rogue
states than an able and willing nation like the United States, acting as a
policeman of the world within all legal boundaries. This is the essence of
the preamble to the United Nations Charter.
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